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SYMPOSIUM 
Foreword 
Thurgood Marshall: Courageous Advocate, 
Compassionate Judge 
SUSAN Low BLOCH* 
Thurgood Marshall's life has spanned virtually the entire twentieth cen-
tury, allowing him to witness its worst and its best. When he was born in 
1908, segregation was legal and pervasive, and racial hatred extreme; in the 
year of his birth alone, eighty-nine black men were lynched. 1 A grandson of 
slaves on both sides of his family, Marshall knew, from an early age, both the 
ugliness and the tenacity of racism. Determined to fight it, Marshall disre-
garded the difficulties and the dangers, and spent his life battling discrimina-
tion, earning the nickname "Mr. Civil Rights." His efforts, coupled with 
those of others in the NAACP, were largely responsible for moving this 
country from a segregated, ugly society toward one that is better, albeit-as 
the recent Rodney King events remind us-far from perfect. 
As the articles in this symposium make clear, from his early college sit-
down in the "whites only" orchestra section of the movies (eschewing the 
"nigger heaven" balcony) to his final passionate dissent on the Supreme 
Court, Marshall consistently championed the underdog and fought for jus-
tice. His contributions are enormous. As President Lyndon Johnson noted 
when he nominated him for the Supreme Court, Marshall would be a legend 
even if he had never sat on the Court.2 His efforts to outlaw segregation and 
fight for equality are undoubtedly among the most important accomplish-
ments in this century. 
Once on the Court-when "Mr. Civil Rights" became "Mr. Justice"-
Marshall continued his fight for justice. He continually reminded his fellow 
Justices they were not simply deciding arcane academic questions; these were 
real disputes affecting real people. He made his colleagues aware of the facts 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Law Clerk to Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, 1976 Term. 
1. ALLEN DAY GRIMSHAW, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1969). 
2. On Marshall's nomination, President Johnson said, "I believe he has already earned his place 
in history, but I think it will be greatly enhanced by his service on the Court." Roy Reed, Marshall 
Named for High Court, Its First Negro, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1967, at AI, 32. As Judge Ralph 
Winter, a former Marshall clerk, has noted, by the time Marshall became a judge, he had been 
"chased by gangs, received by Presidents (eagerly and not so eagerly), and had his picture on the 
cover of Time magazine." Ralph K. Winter, TM's Legacy, 101 YALE L.J. 25, 26 (1991). 
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they chose to ignore, as well as those they never learned. As Justice White 
recently noted: 
Thurgood could tell us the way it was, and he did so convincingly, often 
embellishing with humorous, sometimes hair-raising, stories straight from 
his own past. He characteristically would tell us things that we knew but 
would rather forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the 
limitations of our own experiences. 3 
Consider, for example, Marshall's angry dissent in United States v. Kras, 4 
when the majority held that a mandatory fifty dollar fee to file for bank-
ruptcy was constitutional. 5 A poor person, the majority assumed, could sim-
ply pay the fee in weekly installments. Marshall chastised the majority for 
failing to understand "how close to the margin of survival" many poor peo-
ple are. 6 "The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the 
majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity."7 Angry with the 
majority's callous ignorance, Marshall concluded: "It is perfectly proper for 
judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful 
for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded as-
sumptions about how people live."8 
Marshall's ability to introduce the real world of the poor and oppressed 
into the Supreme Court conference room is not new information. He has 
frequently been highly praised for this contribution.9 But Justice Marshall 
did more than merely give a voice to unheard masses; he proposed ways of 
analyzing cases that would actually make it harder for judges to hide behind 
sterile formalisms, and would instead force their focus onto the realities of 
the cases and the real people behind them. This contribution can be seen in 
numerous areas of the law and, in fact, is well illustrated by many of the 
articles in this symposium. 
In the field of equal protection, for example, Marshall criticized the rigid-
ity of the Court's formalistic analysis. Under the majority's approach, one 
asked first whether a statute affected a suspect classification or a fundamental 
right; if it did, it was subjected to "strict scrutiny," which almost always 
3. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1215, 1216 
(1992). See also William J. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in 
American Jurisprudence, 40 Mo. L. REV. 390, 394 (1981). 
4. 409 u.s. 434 (1973). 
5. · !d. at 446. 
6. Id. at 459-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
7. Id. at 460. 
8. Id. 
9. For other articles celebrating this role see, for example, Brennan, supra note 3, at 393; Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, The Candor of Justice Marshall, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 83 (1989); Karen 
Hastie Williams, Humanizing the Legal Process: The Legacy of Thurgood Marshall. 6 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER J. 90 (1989). 
1992] FOREWORD 2005 
meant that it would be found unconstitutional. 10 If, however, a statute fell 
outside that narrow categorization, it would be upheld if it was rational-
and virtually everything was found rational. 11 Marshall proposed a more 
flexible approach under which courts would examine the importance of the 
rights that were affected by the statute and the likely political strength of the 
affected group. 12 The more important the interests and the more insular and 
unpopular the affected group, the closer the scrutiny and the more justifica-
tion the Court should demand. Marshall's approach was a more realistic 
"sliding scale," instead of a rigid, all-or-none categorization. While Marshall 
was never able to get a majority of the Court to explicitly adopt his proposal, 
his persistent criticism ultimately prodded the Court to apply their approach 
more ftexibly. 13 
Similarly, in the area of the regulation of immigration and aliens, Justice 
Marshall rejected the Court's simplistic view that Congress's power over 
aliens was plenary and thus permitted arbitrary, invidious discriminations. 
In Fiallo v. Bell, 14 for example, the Court had to rule on the constitutionality 
of Congress's denying illegitimate children the right to be reunited with their 
fathers in this country, while granting that right both to legitimate children 
and to illegitimate children and their mothers. 15 In effect, the statute denied 
a traditionally disfavored group of parents and children the fundamental 
right to be able to live together. Notwithstanding this, the majority upheld 
the legislation with virtually no scrutiny. It did so because, it said, there is 
"limited ... judicial inquiry into immigration legislation." 16 The majority 
tried to pretend that this legislation did not give rights to United States citi-
zens to be reunited with their family but was only extending a privilege to 
aliens to enter the countryY Marshall deftly pointed out the incongruity 
10. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 349 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking as violative of the fundamental 
right to travel a statute denying welfare assistance to residents of state who have not resided within 
jurisdiction for a least one year); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding 
unconstitutional the exclusion of blacks from jury service). 
11. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (using rational relation 
test to uphold New York statute prohibiting as distractions advertisements on vehicles). 
12. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (statute setting different ages at which men and women could buy beer violates Equal Protec-
tion clause because gender based classifications did not serve important government interest); 
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 466-69 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (statute 
prohibiting group homes for the mentally retarded invalid under heightened scrutiny because not 
narrowly tailored to serve city's asserted interest). 
13. See. e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985). 
14. 430 u.s. 787 (1977). 
15. !d. at 789. 
16. Id. at 792. 
17. The majority's approach in Fiallo was typical of its general approach in the area of immigra-
tion. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. 
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and absurdity of such a distinction: 
[Congress's] focus was on citizens and their need for relief from the hard-
ships occasioned by the immigration laws. The right to seek such relief was 
given only to the citizen, not the alien. . . . If the citizen does not petition 
the Attorney General for the special "immediate relative" status for his 
parent or child, the alien, despite his relationship, can receive no prefer-
ence .... It is irrelevant that aliens have no constitutional right to immi-
grate and that Americans have no constitutional right to compel the 
admission of their families. The essential fact here is that Congress did 
choose to extend such privileges to American citizens but then denied them 
to a small class of citizens. When Congress draws such lines among citi-
zens, the Constitution requires that the decision comport with Fifth 
Amendment principles of equal protection and due process. The simple 
fact that the discrimination is set in immigration legislation cannot insulate 
from scrutiny the invidious abridgement of citizens' fundamental 
interests. 18 
In the esoteric area of justiciability as well, Marshall was able to pierce 
potentially obfuscating doctrine and get to the heart of the matter. When 
Gary Gilmore was about to be executed and his mother sought to enjoin the 
execution so that the constitutionality of the state law imposing the death 
penalty could be assessed, the Court held, in a quintessential example of for-
malistic, callous doctrine, that his mother had no standing to object to the 
execution of her son. 19 Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and White, 
was appropriately appalled. In Marshall's view, no one could grant the state 
the power to execute unconstitutionally.20 Thus, even if Gilmore were com-
petent to waive his right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, he 
could not consent to his own execution and his mother, clearly injured by the 
impending execution of her son, would have standing to challenge its consti-
tutionality. The majority's willingness to let Gilmore be executed under a 
potentially unconstitutional statute-and he was executed--on the ground 
that his mother did not have standing, is a shocking example of legal formal-
ism at its worst. 
Similarly, as Professor Minow points out well in her article in this issue, 
Marshall also had a sophisticated, realistic view of personal choice.21 His 
conception was not the simplistic all-or-none proposition that the majority of 
INT'L. L. 862, 868-69 (1989) (criticizing the Court's limited scrutiny of substantive immigration 
decisions). 
18. Fia/lo, 430 U.S. at 806-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
19. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976). 
20. ld. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
21. Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 GEo. L.J. 2093, 
2107-08 (1992). 
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the Court generally employs. Unlike his brethren, Marshall recognized the 
importance of context and constraints: 
[Marshall] illuminated the way that all choices arise within constraints, but 
the constraints vary, and thereby alter the range of choices. He paid par-
ticular attention to the specific costs people would bear if they exercised a 
choice, and used this to hold powerful figures, such as public officials, ac-
countable when they claimed that a private individual had a choice to 
avoid their force. 22 
In the context of tax cases,. as well, as Professor Cohen's article reveals, 
Justice Marshall made a substantial contribution by introducing a sense of 
reality into the analysis of tax laws.23 Here too, Marshall rejected wooden, 
formal tests and replaced them with functional analyses that looked at the 
reality of transactions. 24 
Marshall's efforts to make the law more humane and accessible was, as the 
foregoing reveals, constant and pervasive. While he did not always succeed 
in convincing a majority of his colleagues to join his approach, his was a 
voice to be heard and reckoned with. In Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's 
words: 
His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social fabric 
and used law to help heal them. His was the ear of a counselor who under-
stood the vulnerabilities of the accused and established safeguards for their 
protection. His was the mouth of a man who knew the anguish of the 
silenced and gave them a voice. 25 
The power of Marshall's voice and vision was all the more effective be-
cause he was never afraid to "tell it like it is"-either on the bench or off. In 
the midst of the national euphoric celebration of the bicentennial of the Con-
stitution, he pointedly reminded us that the document, as originally adopted, 
was seriously flawed. 26 It had no place in it for blacks or women; in fact, the 
Constitution accepted and condoned slavery. But just as characteristically, 
Marshall noted the good side as well. The Constitution was a living docu-
ment that allowed itself to be improved, and it had been. "'We the People' 
no longer enslave," Marshall said, "but the credit does not belong to the 
framers. It belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of 
'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to better them .... [T]he 
22. Id. at 2107. 
23. Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1992). 
24. See, e.g., Professor Cohen's discussion of Corn Prod. Ref Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 
(1955), and Arkansas Best v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Cohen, supra note 23, at 2019-25. 
25. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1217, 1217 (1992). 
26. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. I 
(1987). 
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true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its life . . . . I plan to 
celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitution as a living document, including 
the Bill of Rights and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms 
and human rights."27 And he did. Both as advocate and as jurist, Thurgood 
Marshall believed passionately in the rule of law, and dedicated his life to 
advancing the rights of the poor, the unrepresented, and the downtrodden. 
Equally characteristic of the Marshall voice-clear, unflinching, and per-
suasive-was his final opinion issued on the day he retired, an angry dissent 
in Payne v. Tennessee. 28 In Payne, the Court overruled two very recent cases 
in order to hold that the prosecution can introduce in death penalty cases 
evidence concerning the impact of the crime on the victim's family. Marshall 
was outraged not only by the decision, but by the Court's cavalier disregard 
of precedent and its casual willingness to overrule two cases that had just 
been decided in 1987 and 1989. Predicting more such attacks on precedents, 
Marshall angrily chastised his brethren: "Power, not reason, is the new cur-
rency of this Court's decisionmaking."29 
It is this unique combination of conviction, candor, and courage that 
makes Thurgood Marshall a most compelling force. His colleague and close 
friend, Justice Brennan, captured Marshall's invaluable contribution: 
[Marshall added] a special voice . . . . His was a voice of authority: he 
spoke from first-hand knowledge of the law's failure to fulfill its promised 
protections for so many Americans. It was also the voice of reason, for 
Justice Marshall had spent half a lifetime using the tools of legal argument 
to close the gap between constitutional ideal and reality. And it was a 
voice with an unwavering message: that the Constitution's protection must 
not be denied to anyone and that the Court must give its constitutional 
doctrine the scope and sensitivity needed to assure that result. Justice Mar-
shall's voice was often persuasive, but whether or not he prevailed in a 
given instance, he always had an impact ... [speaking] for those who might 
otherwise be forgotten. 30 
His voice, and its powerful echoes, will long endure. 
27. /d. at 5 (emphasis added). 
28. Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., with Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
29. /d. 
30. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall. 105 HARV. L. REv. 23, 23-
25 (1991). 
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On a less formal note, I cannot resist taking advantage of this forum for a 
moment of personal privilege. 
Dear Judge: 
On behalf of your former clerks and numerous other fans and admirers, I 
want to tell you what we think of you-in a forum in which you cannot tell 
us to be quiet or call us (again) "knuckleheads." 
You have been an inspiration to all of us. Your dedication to justice, your 
bravery and conviction, your humor and modesty have been models we strive 
to emulate. It is no accident that so many of your law clerks have gone into 
public service--our role model was irresistible. We, too, hope "we can do 
what we can with what we have."31 We thank you with all our hearts for the 
improvements you have wrought in our world and for the irreversible impact 
you have made on our own lives. We love you, Judge. 
The Knuckleheads 
31. When Marshall announced his retirement on June 28, 1991, he was asked by a reporter how 
he wanted to be remembered: As a person who "did what he could with what he had," he re-
sponded. Ruth Marcus, Plain-Spoken Marshall Spars With Reporters, WASH. PosT, June 29, 1991, 
at AI, AIO. See also Randall Kennedy, Doing What You Can With What You Have: The Greatness 
of Justice Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2081 (1992). 
